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ISSN 0455-0420East Germany can be considered a laboratory experiment in the economics of transition. Of the three
major issues in economic reforms in the transformation process — establishing an institutional infra-
structure, creating monetary stability, and accomplishing adjustment in the economy, especially in the
firms — two issues were solved nearly instantaneously. Monetary stabilization was achieved by ex-
tending the currency area of the deutsche mark to East Germany in the currency union of July 1, 1990.
And the institutional infrastructure was, in principle, introduced at one stroke when East Germany
joined West Germany, as provided for in Article 23 of the German constitution. Thus, only the third
major issue of reform remains to be solved, namely real adjustment in the economy, especially in the
previously state-owned firms.
In the German case, transformation of a socialist economy and integration of two different eco-
nomic systems are occurring simultaneously. This creates favorable conditions for eastern Germany in
that western Germany can provide it with huge transfers. Thus, one could describe German unification
as being the big bang with the big brother. But there are also less favorable conditions that impede the
adjustment process: the exchange rate is not available as a shock absorber, and wage equalization is an
important issue.
I. The Long-Run Perspective and the Shock
In a long-run perspective, land and qualified labor were added to the western German economy. East-
ern Germany can be expected to have a positive growth perspective due to the incentives of the mar-
ket system, due to its integration into the international division of labor, and due to the capital accu-
mulation that will be associated with a high growth rate. But the capital stock of eastern Germany was
obsolete.
We know very well from the economics of transition [Siebert, 1991a; Long and Siebert, 1992] that
the transition from a centralized socialist planning system to a market economy represents a shock to
the representative socialist firm, changing all its contraints, including the price vector. For the over-
whelming number of the 316 state-owned eastern German firms, this shock can be modeled as a sud-
den unexpected drop in the producer's price. This implies that the capital stock of the firm or the firm
itself, as a net of contractual relationships, becomes largely obsolete.
Aggregating over all firms indicates that the capital stock of the eastern Germany economy is obso-
lete to a considerable degree. It has to be rebuilt through investment. Human capital in its given occu-
pations is also shown to be partly obsolete, although the qualifications of eastern German workers are
judged as being not too different from those of western Germans. By reallocating and retraining, hu-
man capital can adjust. The concept of obsoleteness can also be applied to infrastructure capital,
which has to be improved and restructured. Another stock variable that is shown to be obsolete is the
spatial structure of the economy. Last but not least, the capital of nature, the environment, which was
polluted under the old system, will have to be restored.
German unification was a real shock to the East German economy. Productivity was at one-third of
the West German level in 1989; the output of the manufacturing industry plummeted to one-third of
Revised version of a paper presented in the "Political Economy Lecture Series" of Harvard University, March
16, 1993. This paper is a sequel to my previous Kiel Discussion Papers: "The Economic Integration of Ger-
many" (No. 160, May 1990), "The Economic Integration of Germany — An Update" (No. 160a, September
1990), and "Five Traps for German Economic Policy" (No. 185, April 1992).the output in 1989. GDP fell to roughly 50 percent of the initial level (Figure 1). Exports fell to one-
third of their level in 1989 (Figure Al in the Appendix).
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For the adjustment process of the economy in transition to a market system, we obtain a J-curve of
aggregate output, falling abruptly and eventually catching up with the adjustment of still existing
firms and with new firms' coming into existence. In 1992, the bottom of the J-curve of output was
reached in eastern Germany.
In spite of a real GDP growth rate of 6.8 in 1992 a self-sustained growth process has not yet begun.
GDP was 197.5 billion DM in 1992 (in constant 1991 prices), 7.7 percent of the western German
level, whereas the population in eastern Germany accounts for 20 percent of the total German popula-
tion. Aggregate domestic demand in eastern Germany in 1992 (in constant 1991 prices) amounted to
388.7 billion DM, i.e., 197 percent of GDP (for nominal figures, see Table Al). The trade deficit of
roughly 190 billion DM was financed by public transfers, which are estimated at 150 billion DM for
the government sector, and by private capital flows.
The number of employed in eastern Germany fell from 9.9 million in the second half of 1989 to 5
million at the end of 1992, if we only consider the first labor market (Figure 2). The transition in em-
ployment will not follow a full J but a U. Note that total employment in the prereform period reflected
the conditions of the old system. After all the adjustment has taken place, long-run equilibrium em-
ployment (for instance, for married women) will be considerably lower than the prereform level. Be-
cause its response to output is delayed, employment is still falling, while industrial output is stagnat-
ing and GNP is rising slightly. Registered unemployment is at 1.2 million, 400,000 commute, and 1.7
million are in the second labor market, out of which 800,000 have gone into early retirement. During
the upswing a time-lag is also to be expected before employment reacts.
A simple formula tells us how much time is needed for eastern Germany to catch up with western
Germany. Consider a case where eastern Germany reaches 80 percent of the western German level of
GNP per capita. This is not an unrealistic frame of reference, since in western Germany some regions
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"Fourth quarter 1989. - "Fop example, early retirement, hidden reserves. - "Employees
In Job preserving schemes and retraining programs. - "Partly estimated.
growth rates between eastern and western Germany. Table 1 shows for various growth differentials
the years needed for an adjustment of 80 percent to take place.
1 Such calculations should be taken
with a grain of salt; it is quite conceivable that in specific years high growth rates in the 15 percent
range will occur in eastern Germany.
Table 1 — Time Needed for Eastern Germany to Reach 80 percent of Western German Level

















Self-sustained growth can only start if the obsolete capital stock is rebuilt from scratch. Assuming
that eastern Germany will have the same capital stock per capita as western Germany after the trans-
formation process has ended, the capital stock of the enterprise sector would be 1,300 billion DM
(Table A2).
2 This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation for accumulated investment assuming that the
existing capital stock is completely obsolete. Infrastructure capital in western Germany amounted to
2,179 billion DM in 1991. This figure includes public buildings and equipment, and road, railroad,
waterway, postal, and communications infrastructures. Using the infrastructure of western Germany as
a frame of reference, infrastructure capital in eastern Germany should amount to 545 billion DM. As-
suming that one-third of the capital stock is usable, and assuming a ten-year period of adjustment, a
1 Let 7 ^ and Y^ be the initial GNP in eastern and western Germany, let a be the level to be reached, let
fi = 0.25 indicate the size of the eastern German population relative to western Germany, and let r
w and /^
denote the growth rates, then
<#*(*"•).•*[*••)
2 The total western German capital stock was 12,687 billion DM in 1991, that of the enterprise sector 5,201
billion DM.rough calculation shows that private investment of 90 billion DM and public investment of 40 billion
DM per year, i.e., 130 billion DM per year, would be needed.
3
Actually, investment was 110 billion DM in 1992, amounting to 47 percent of eastern German
GNP. Private investment accounted for 50 percent of total investment. For 1993, investment in the
order of 130 billion DM is expected [Sachverstandigenrat, 1992].
It would be tempting to apply the western German output-capital ratio to calculate the growth effect
of a given investment. For instance, applying the western German average output-capital ratio of 5.0
to the investment of 130 billion DM expected for 1993, the increase in GNP should be 26 billion DM.
Private investment, if it were 60 billion DM, would yield a proportionately higher increase in GNP of
24 billion DM, using an output-capital ratio for the enterprise sector of 2.5. These calculations are
misleading in different ways. On the one hand old capital is still being scrapped, and this has a nega-
tive effect on aggregate output. Over time, this effect should become less important. On the other
hand, in an economy where the capital stock is rebuilt from scratch, the output effect of investment
should be higher than given by the average output-capital ratio.
The marginal output-capital ratio, measured by the increase in GNP to the increase in the gross
capital stock, has shown great variation since 1950. Whereas in the late 1980s values were around
0.45, the early 1950s saw values larger than 1 (Table A3). This would indicate a situation in which
investment would increase GNP by the same amount.
II. The Adjustment Process
It has been hotly debated whether the western German comprehensive currency and economic reform
of 1948 can serve as an analogy for eastern Germany. The monetary overhang of inflation that had
been suppressed since 1936 was reduced by exchanging 100 reichsmarks into 6.5 new deutsche marks
for financial assets and using a 1:1 ratio for a standard sum up to 60 DM per head. Central admini-
stration of the economy was eliminated and prices for most commodities were freed (exceptions were
basic foods, iron and steel, wages, housing rents, and public services).
The current situation differs from 1948 [Balogh, 1950; Wallich, 1955] in many respects, ranging
from the distortion faced by socialist firms as they experience an unexpected shock to ownership un-
certainty and administrative bottlenecks (Figure 3). It must be remembered, too, that the initial shock
in postwar Germany really occurred in 1945, and not in 1948 [Schatz and Schmidt, 1992; Schmie-
ding, 1991]. In 1945, industrial production in western Germany dropped to a quarter of the level it had
reached in 1936 [Ritschl, 1985]. By 1948, the industrial production level had nearly doubled relative
to its 1945 level, standing at roughly 50 percent of its 1936 level. Thus, some adjustment had already
taken place prior to 1948, eliminating the most important bottlenecks. Compared to the J-curve of
output in eastern Germany in 1990-91, output increased after the Erhard reforms in 1948, and, in
contrast with the U-curve, employment then remained stable even though unemployment rose due to
the inflow of refugees.
4 Besides there being specific bottlenecks in eastern Germany, additional fac-
tors contribute to making 1990 different from 1948: the appreciation of the East German Mark, labor
market regulations and the wage-setting process, and the aspirations of the East German population.
It might seem that a currency depreciation would have been appropriate to ease the burden of tran-
sition for East Germany. But in any case, political rationality dominated purely economic considera-
tions, as the need for a very quick political union all but eliminated the two-currency-area option.
Calculations for public investment do not include environmental protection.
4 The Marshall plan is often cited as one important factor contributing to a quick recovery in West Germany.
But it accounted only for 1.4 percent of West German GNP, whereas now western German transfers to
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"Third quarter 1947 and 1989 = 100.
Source: Schmieding [1991, p. 16]; updated.8
Neglecting the myriad of product-, firm-, or sector-specific exchange rates, the choice of a "one to
one" rate amounted to an appreciation of the East German mark of 440 percent vis-a-vis the deutsche
mark. This admittedly is in contrast with the 21 percent depreciation of the deutsche mark in 1949. In
addition, the artificial system of fixed exchange rates within the COMECON, the so-called transfer-
able ruble, has ceased to exist; intra-COMECON trade has collapsed. Moreover, internal problems in
the CIS have sharply cut a source of external demand previously crucial for East German firms (see
Figure Al).
With the exchange rate no longer available as an instrument, competitiveness depends, in principle,
on the wage rate. Trade unions have pushed for high wage increases. Converting wages at a rate of 1:1
formed expectations among the East German population. As bargaining took place before privatiza-
tion had started, the previous managers were still in place, and West German managers only partly
represented the capital owner, the trade unions did not have a strong counterpart. Moreover, as many
managers and workers expected to lose their jobs soon, wage bargaining represented an end game, es-
pecially as unemployment benefits were expected to be linked to wage rates. Last but not least, there
was no attempt by the government to control the wage increases. In contrast, Poland instituted a spe-
cial tax to discourage wage increases.
At the end of 1992, the negotiated wage per hour in eastern Germany had reached 70 percent of the
western German level, whereas productivity, estimated at one-third of the West German level prior to
the currency union [Siebert, 1990], was at 39 percent. The wedge between productivity and wages has
widened (Figure 4).
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Source: DIW [1992]; own calculations and estimates.
The marked difference from 1948 is the aspiration level of the eastern German population. They
expected to reach the western German consumption level quickly, and this expectation was formed by
the political promise of the 1:1 conversion rate. This topic dominated the election campaign in East
Germany in March 1990, and politically the 1:1 conversion rate can be interpreted as a lever to influ-
ence the composition of the first free East German parliament, which, incidently, had to sign the uni-
fication treaty.The eastern German experience reminds us that a supply response needs time. In addition, a major
issue is the extent to which bottlenecks in eastern Germany are hindering investment and preventing
the growth process from starting and gaining momentum. These factors are the uncertainty with re-
spect to property rights, a public administration system that had (and still has) to be set up, and —
what is very important — delays in administrative and political decisions. This is mainly due to the
institutional set-up of authorization procedures adopted from the West German system. Larger infra-
structure projects in western Germany, such as main highways or new railroad tracks, require up to
twenty years from the start of planning to completion. It is quite clear that with time horizons of this
length, the infrastructure in eastern Germany cannot be built up quickly. It remains to be seen whether
a law attempting to reduce the requirements of authorization procedures will be successful. An in-
itially insufficient infrastructure in communications and transportation was also a bottleneck.
III. Privatization
Privatization involves land (including houses) and firms. Two million applications have been submit-
ted by expropriated land-owners seeking to have their ownership rights reinstated. Each of these ap-
plications has to be decided on administratively. Title records are not up to date and inheritance rela-
tionships are rather complex. Moreover, each administrative decision can be challenged in the admin-
istrative court system. It is estimated that 14 percent of the applications had been decided by January
1993. It is expected that it will take ten years to clarify the remaining ownership claims.
The most important issue is the reprivatization and the privatization of previously state-owned
firms. As regards the reprivatization of firms, roughly 7,000 firms out of 17,000 had been reprivatized
by January 1993. As regards the privatization of firms, the Treuhand had privatized or partly privat-
ized 11,234 firms out of 12,672 firms in the productive sector by January 1993. Formally, the Treu-
hand still has 2,442 firms in its portfolio. For some of them, privatization is nearly completed so that
the task is to privatize the remaining 1,400 firms (March 1993). Out of these, 300 are agricultural es-
tates. Based on the sales contracts, the employment of 1.4 million persons and the investment of 140
billion DM are to be expected. In addition, an investment of 30 billion DM in the energy sector is
planned. The Treuhand still has 400,000 employees, after starting out with 4.08 million in 1990.
The bulk of privatization has been accomplished. The Treuhand will probably be closed at the end
of 1993 or early in 1994. Out of the firms in the enterprise sector remaining to be privatized, 22 firms
have between 1,000 and 1,500 employees (hence a total of 26,771), and 36 firms have more than
1,500 employees (total employment 187,245). In industry, 850 firms, with 240,000 Treuhand em-
ployees, are left to be privatized.
IV. An Explicit Structural Policy?
The breakdown of the eastern German economy has led to the political demand for an explicit struc-
tural policy for eastern Germany. The main argument is to soften the adjustment process for firms in
order to reduce the negative impact on employment.
Such a policy would perpetuate the inefficiencies of the socialist planning system because it would
de facto be oriented towards the old structures. The option of modernizing eastern Germany would be
lost. East Germany would remain a problem area for many years to come. The inefficient firms would
have to be subsidized heavily. As subsidies are determined politically, they would become locked in,
and it would be extremely difficult to reduce them in the future. Moreover, managers and entrepre-10
neurs would be engaged in rent seeking instead of fulfilling their role of innovating and implementing
new allocations of factors of production.
Subsidized old firms would get in the way of new firms. They would block location space that is
needed for the creation of new firms. This is especially relevant when location space is in short supply
due to the uncertainty about property rights. We also know from West German sectoral policy that
subsidized firms tend to determine the wage rate of a region. Subsidies allow them to pay a high
wage, which impedes the new firms. Last but not least, subsidized firms often compete with new
firms on the product markets.
The alternative to such a conservationist policy is to decouple the protection of people and the con-
servation of inefficient firms. Transfers to people will ease the burden of adjustment. Basically, this is
the approach being used, with transfers being made to those on short-time work and with active forms
of employment policy (among them so-called "employment companies," which employ 350,000 per-
sons) and retraining programs (400,000 had been retrained at the end of 1992) being implemented.
There is not only a political call for a structural policy for the existing firms, but also additional
pressure for a more active role of government in developing future industries. It is argued that the
government should decide which sectors should be developed and which industries should be targeted
for the future. This approach is very likely to be a severe failure. The government does not have in-
formation on which products will sell well, which production procedure will be efficient, and which
industry will flourish in the future. The root of the issue is the Hayekian problem of information on
future economic and technological possibilities. This information is not available today, and competi-
tion is decisive for revealing this information. Industrial targeting will forego competition as an ex-
ploratory device [Hayek, 1968]; by not allocating the risks of failure to the investor, such a policy
would set the wrong incentives. .
V. Fiscal Policy and the Macroeconomic Policy Mix
Unification was also a shock to the German economy as a whole. Germany after unification is charac-
terized by a high capital demand, with capital being needed to replace the capital stock in eastern
Germany and to finance public consumption transfers. At the same time, there is an excess supply of
labor, with 3.5 million officially unemployed and 2.5 million in the secondary labor market.
Another basic condition in Germany is the need for governmental transfers, which are running at
150 billion DM per year. In addition, German fiscal policy has to finance the interest payments on the
additional debt burden, which roughly calculated is 30 billion DM [Siebert, 1993].
5 All in all, Ger-
many will have to finance 180 billion DM per year (6 percent of GNP). There are three options: (1)
Increasing the debt, (2) reducing expenditures while shifting public expenditures to eastern Germany,
or (3) increasing taxation.
The overall German government budget deficit, including the federal, state, and municipal levels,
as well as the social security system, amounted to 140 billion DM in 1992; this is 4.7 percent of GNP.
These data include the Treuhand deficit of 30 billion DM for 1992. If the governmental telecommuni-
cations services and the railroads are included, the public sector capital demand amounted to roughly
170 billion DM in 1992.
It is estimated that the Treuhand will accumulate a debt of 250 billion DM by 1994. The Credit
Processing Fund (Kreditabwicklungsfonds), which manages the liabilities of the former GDR and
covers the differential conversion rates for the debt of socialist firms and for individual savings, will
Note that part of the interest payments on the so-called inherited debt is already included in the calculation
of the transfers.11
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Figure 6 — Public Expenditures, Taxes, and Social Security Contributions in Germany, 1950-1994
(percent of GNP)
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have to be taken over by the federal government. It is estimated that a debt of 140 billion DM will
have been accumulated by the fund. The German Unity Fund, funded by the federal government and
the Lander, will have accumulated 95 billion DM at the end of 1994. The debt of the public housing
sector will be 50 billion DM.
The debt of the total public sector, which amounted to 929 billion DM in 1989, will have reached
1.9 trillion DM by 1994. Thus, public debt will double within five years. In relative terms, the ratio of
public debt to GNP will rise from 41 percent in 1989 to 58 percent in 1994 (Figure 5). Public ex-
penditures relative to GNP will rise from 45 percent in 1989 to over 52 percent in 1994 (Figure 6).
The risk for the future is that the budget deficit will have a strong impact on economic policy. The
government may lose its maneuvering space because of high interest payments. Unexpected expendi-
tures may arise. Government revenue may fall because of a less favorable business cycle, as in 1993.
Financing expenditures may raise either interest rates or taxes, and this will choke off investment. The
most serious danger is that the financial constraints will develop into a severe burden for the western
German economy, which has to finance the transfers to eastern Germany. This could trigger a vicious
circle in which the problems of the east eventually influence the efficiency of the west.
In the solidarity pact of March 1993, an attempt was made to integrate the eastern German Lander
into Germany's horizontal transfer system among the Lander (Finanzausgleich) and to allocate the fi-
nancing of the transfers to the different federal layers of government. Although the solution found was
positive in the sense that the discussion on what to do and what not to do came to an end, the com-
promise solution does not satisfy economic criteria:
— The Lander and communities in western Germany, representing public expenditures of 540 bil-
lion DM, account for only an underproportional part of the financial burden, which is mainly
shouldered by the federal government, which has expenditures of 430 billion DM.
— It apparently was not possible for the political process to cut expenditures considerably; instead,
it took recourse to raising taxes.
— The conditions for economic growth in western Germany have worsened for the 1990s, with
the share of government expenditures rising from 45 in 1989 to over 52 percent in 1994 and the
share of taxes and social security contributions rising from 41.7 in 1989 to almost 45 percent in
1994. The additional growth stimulus provided by eastern Germany will be partly offset by the
changed quality of the western German economy.
A consolidation strategy was not followed in setting up the solidarity pact. In the future, the princi-
pal task of German economic policy must be to bring down the share of government expenditures to
GNP. This should be done by cutting expenditures. The politically easiest way to do this is to cap the
nominal increase in government expenditures. Whereas the federal government is attempting to keep
the nominal increase of expenditures below 3 percent for 1993, there is no mechanism available by
which the Lander and the municipalities in western Germany can be forced to reduce their spending.
Instead of limiting increases in expenditures, it would be more appropriate to use a zero-base budget-
ary approach to cut expenditures, including subsidies, and to restructure expenditures under the new
economic environment of a united Germany. In many areas, western Germany and eastern Germany
compete for investable funds. This holds, of course, for infrastructure projects in western Germany
which may be postponed for a year or two; it applies to subsidies for specific western German sectors,
such as the hard coal industry, which competes directly with the brown coal industry in eastern Ger-
many, and it holds for regional policy subsidies going to regions in western Germany that are better
off than areas in eastern Germany. So far, the political process has not had enough vigor to restructure
governmental expenditures. The German public has not yet understood that the unification of Ger-
many has changed some conditions that were basic to West German policies, some of which no longer
prevail.13
Privatizing infrastructure as an interesting option to reduce governmental expenditure has not been
pursued; in eastern Germany, it would have had the additional advantage of providing infrastructure
much more quickly. The communications sector could have been privatized, financing itself by means
of user charges. Unfortunately, this policy has not been followed. German economic policy has not
been daring and innovative enough to introduce the privatization of some parts of infrastructure. Pri-
vatization still is an option in the transportation sector, for instance, with respect to airports, roads,
and railroad connections; privatization can also be used for industrial parks and local environmental
projects such as water purification plants. Finally, it could be applied to many activities at the munici-
pal level. In these cases, the government would only have to set the frame of reference within which
private projects could be undertaken.
Germany experienced a unification boom in 1990 and 1991, which was a Keynesian demand boost,
with the transfers from western Germany financing an increase in demand in eastern Germany (Figure
7). But with transfers having reached a certain level, there is no additional demand stimulus, unless
transfers are increased. This, however, would give rise to opportunity costs in the future, such as in-
creased government debt. The recession of 1993 in western Germany can be considered to be the
implication of the Keynesian program: the discussion on financing the transfers has sown considerable
uncertainty in the western German economy. The high government spending and the high increase in
wages in the unification boom have contributed to the recession.
Figure 7 — Cyclical Changes in the GDP




























"At constant prices; percentage change over previous year. -
 bForecast.
Germany is in the process of finding a new macroeconomic policy mix. Fiscal policy has to solve
the problem of financing the transfers to eastern Germany without disturbing the western German
economy. Wage policy has to take into consideration the excess supply of labor (Table A4). In eastern
Germany, long-run wage agreements attempted to raise wages quickly (26 percent in 1993 in the
metals industry). This widening wedge between productivity and wages must be reduced by more
moderate wage rounds. In western Germany, the wage increase of 5.8 percent in 1992 exceeded the
productivity increase of 0.9 percent, and a similar distortion occurred in 1991. Wage policy must
come back to being orientated towards productivity.
German monetary policy has operated under difficult conditions. First, the inflation rate is still high
at over 4 percent in early 1993. Second, the increase in the money supply during German unification14
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in 1990 was relatively high, and the actual increase in prices in the years 1992 and 1993 may well be
the result of the increase in the money supply two years earlier (Figure 8). Third, money growth was
high in 1992, up to 10 percent, and it is too early to tell whether this trend will change considerably in
1993. In any case, long-term interest rates have come down, and are not too different from those of
the United States.
VI. An Analytical Model
We do not yet have a complete model for the integration and the transformation process. However, the
paradigm to be applied has to include elements of integration theory and transformation theory:
(i) From the point of view of integration theory, two economies merge and exploit comparative
advantages. Trade will be created and diverted. Intraindustry trade will develop. Nontradeables will
show a different pattern than tradeables.
(ii) Mobility of capital will be an important vehicle of adjustment. Capital mobility will come
mostly in the form of direct investment, mergers, and acquisitions, or as public investment. Mobility
of labor, though relevant, may be neglected in order to keep the model manageable. The mobility of
factors changes the endowment of the two economies.
(iii) Starting at a low productivity level and a largely obsolete capital stock in eastern Germany,
there will be a growth process fueled by capital and technology transfer, and hopefully by a Schumpe-
terian process involving the creation of new firms and the organizational restructuring of industry.
Bottlenecks, i.e., investment barriers, may be explicitly introduced in order to explain the time profile
of investment.
(iv) Transfers from the west to the east finance the divergence between absorption and production
in the east. The way the transfers are financed has an impact on investment, production, and employ-
ment in the west.
VII. International Repercussions
Germn unification has not only been a real shock to eastern Germany and united Germany, but to the
world economy, and especially to the European economy. The long-run effect of integration, new in-
vestment opportunities, and the incentives of the market system make German unification look like a
"new frontier" in the sense of Alvin Hansen [1955], or like a positive supply shock. Clearly, the po-
tential marginal efficiency of capital in eastern Germany has increased, and the real interest rate will
be driven up from the supply side. A similar effect comes from infrastructure capital, which has a high
marginal productivity in eastern Germany. The effect on the real interest rate of this supply shock can
be viewed as an increase in the marginal productivity of capital or as a shift in the factor price frontier.
This schedule describes the combination of maximum rewards to the factors of production, say capital
and labor, given the state of technology and the available stock of capital. The transition to a market
economy makes the existing capital stock obsolete, because the price vector of the economy is
changed. This shifts the factor price frontier inward. The introduction of new technologies and new
equipment shifts it outward. Note that the initial inward move corresponds to the J-curve effect.
The interest rate effect will be influenced by the availability of capital. In an open economy, capital
inflows reduce the tendency of the interest rate to rise. The extent of the supply shock will also de-
pend on the financing of infrastructure, for instance, whether it is financed privately, by bonds, or by
taxation. Finally, the interest rate observed may reflect inflationary and exchange rate expectations.16
The nominal long-term interest rate (on government bonds) increased in Germany from below 7 per-
cent in the middle of 1989 to around 9 percent after the announcement of the monetary union on Feb-
ruary 7,1990. It came down in early 1993 to below 7 percent (Figure 9).
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An expansionary fiscal policy, with transfers being largely financed by bonds, will add demand-
side pressure on the interest rate. If the Bundesbank sticks to a strict policy stance aimed at maintain-
ing noninflationary growth, the increase in the interest rate will choke off demand. Thus the situation
is similar to the early 1980s in the US when there was a conflict between an expansionary fiscal pol-
icy and monetary restraint. In addition, high wage demands by western German trade unions, as in
1991 and 1992, have aggravated the situation and induced the Bundesbank to pursue a stricter mone-
tary policy.
From the supply side, there should be an appreciation of the deutsche mark in post-wall Germany
[Burda, 1990; Lehment, 1990]. This appreciation can be motivated both by the capital account and the
current account. As concerns the capital account, the appreciation of the deutsche mark is due to a
higher marginal efficiency of capital, i.e., higher rates of return in eastern Germany prompting a larger
capital inflow (reduced capital outflow out of the deutsche mark area) and consequently raising de-
mand for the deutsche mark (Figure 10). As concerns the trade account, the appreciation is a vehicle
to bring about a reduction in the overall trade surplus. This reduction was necessary because eastern
Germany has a trade deficit, thus reducing the overall German trade surplus. The German current ac-
count has changed from a surplus of 110 billion DM in 1989 to a deficit of 40 million DM in 1992 —
a swing of 150 billion DM.
Of course, the appreciation of the deutsche mark is not explained only by German unification.
Other factors, for instance, in the US, might also imply an appreciation of the deutsche mark, and
political instability in the CIS a depreciation. Moreover, it is unclear to what extent the appreciation
had already been anticipated in 1990. Thus, an appreciation would no longer be required.
Policy may change the outcome, though. If subsidies dominate the adjustment process, old ineffi-
ciencies will be perpetuated, limiting the rise in capital efficiency in eastern Germany. More subsidies17
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burden the budget and lead to an increase in debt or in taxes. Investment in eastern Germany will be
financed through capital inflows, and Germany will accumulate foreign debt, as stressed by Wyplosz
[1991]; in the long run, a current account surplus is required to repay the debt, which necessitates a
real exchange rate depreciation. According to this scenario, Germany would repeat the history of the
US in the 1980s by undergoing an investment boom financed by foreign debt, and a transitional ap-
preciation that is corrected later on. Even if German unification is not financed by foreign debt di-
rectly, the intertemporal mechanism of stocks is operating: a reduced current account means a smaller
stock of direct and portfolio investment abroad, which weakens the tendency toward appreciation.
The prediction of a depreciation of the deutsche mark, however, crucially depends on the assump-
tion that western Germany's productivity will simply be extended to a united Germany. It neglects the
integration gains and the effect of new technology through investment in eastern Germany. This might
well change Germany's productivity [see Baldwin, 1989; Romer, 1986]. Indeed, eastern Germany has
the opportunity to incorporate more modern technology than western Germany and can thus enjoy the
advantage of a latecomer. Moreover, economic integration can increase product variety and quality
and thus stimulate exports, preventing a worsening in the terms of trade. Such a dynamic supply-side
effect could, over time, counterbalance the effect of reduced foreign capital accumulation and prevent
a long-run depreciation (unless hurt by misguided structural policies).
German unification represents a country-specific shock to the EMS mechanism. There is no doubt
that high interest rates in Germany negatively affect investment elsewhere. An asymmetric shock is
the typical case where flexible exchange rates are desirable, or where a realignment is necessary.
Thus, a long-run tendency for the deutsche mark to appreciate will put the EMS under pressure. With-
out realignment, the other EMS countries will experience an increase in interest rates, and the ECU,
pulled up by the deutsche mark, can be expected to appreciate against other currencies, thereby reduc-
ing the competitiveness of the ECU area vis-a-vis the rest of the world. The problem must be solved
by a realignment.
As an aside: In the 1980s, potential investors were looking for investment opportunities in the
world economy, since productivity in the industrialized countries was falling. Germany is an invest-18
ment scenario. One should not complain about high long-term interest rates when there is an invest-
ment opportunity.
VIII. Conclusion
Two opposite scenarios for the united Germany were drawn very early in the discussion [Siebert
1990]: the Mezzogiorno and the New Frontier. In the worse case, existing inefficient firms are subsi-
dized in order to protect people. The inefficiency of the eastern German economy continues and the
opportunity to modernize is squandered. Then, a severe drain on Germany's resources would affect
the maneuvring space of fiscal policy in the future. In the alternative scenario, the positive effects of
German unification prevail after the bottlenecks have been overcome. Unification represents a New
Frontier, an investment opportunity or, in Schumpeter's [1934] terms, a case of "creative destruction."
Integration gains, the new economic system, and capital accumulation will all play their role. Eco-
nomic policy will decide which scenario will eventually become reality.
If German economic policy does not make serious mistakes, the long-run effects will dominate, as
in the Hicksian theory of the business cycle, where the lower turning point comes about by
"autonomous investment hammering in the basement." Capital accumulation in eastern Germany is
likely to play a similar role. So I am optimistic and quote Shakespeare: "There is a tide in the affairs
of men which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune. Omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in
shallows and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat, and we must take the current when it
serves ..." (Julius Caesar, IV, 3).19
Appendix
Figure Al —Foreign Trade








Table Al — Nominal GNP and GDP of East
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1991; 1992].
Table A2 — Capital Stock and Investment in East Germany and West Germany
1. Gross domestic product
Total s
Enterprises (without housing)
Goods-producing sectors (mining, manufacturing,
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construction and modernization. — "Evaluated at replacement costs; yearly averages; excluding roads, waterways and
civil engineering, including rail and postal services. —
eCapital stock at ]
sewage systems, and rail and telecommunications systems; for 1988.
986 prices. — 'Including roads, waterways,
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1990]; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung [1989]; own estimates.21
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